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Abstract 
We introduced in this study a model of sovereign debt with an embedded 
Down-and-In Put (DIP) to capture the discontinuity in sovereign debt pricing. This 
study suggests that debt forgiveness is a more effective solution in debt crisis, as 
repayment bonus or award or capital market exclusion penalty invites moral hazard 
and push up yields. Although a debtor’s current repayment capability reflects its 
current levels of repayment award, debt forgiveness or default threshold. While 
forgiveness works unconditionally, a debtor can only receive repayment award 
conditional on full debt repayment, which could result in unfavored consequences due 
to moral hazard. A creditor should therefore avoid offering repayment award to, or 
attempting to lower default threshold on, a debtor. Granting more forgiveness is, 
however, beneficial always. Overall, a strong GDP growth is still the most effective 
solution to lower long-run sovereign yields. Reexamining the argument of Krugman 
(1988) verifies that extra financing is indeed inferior to forgiveness. The forecasting 
errors in our model are only at fractions of those produced by other related studies, as 
our unscented Kalman filter procedure is free of potential econometric problems. Our 
model of default threshold for sovereign debt is more tractable than existing works in 
literature, especially in the calibration of sovereign yields under various debt load 
levels, economic cycles, time to maturity and forecasting capability. Our model can be 
applied in the operation of risk management, as well as portfolio investments, for 
investors of sovereign debt instruments.  
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I. Introduction
Sovereign default has been widely studied to explain what causes it, what costs it brings, how 
it can be avoided and what can be done to mitigate its consequences. Earlier works focus more on 
defaults by less developed countries (LDC) or smaller economies, and many argue that countries 
choose to default in their interests. Default probabilities are forecasted according to regressive 
findings between sovereign yields and observed default risks attributable usually unilaterally to 
sovereign debtors. However, events or factors arising in the debt negotiation process, which 
involve also choices of the creditors, have not been considered as often when forecasting future 
sovereign yields.  
Recent sovereign debt crisis in the European Union indicates that the expectation of such 
factor as debt forgiveness affects significantly sovereign yields not only of the subject country, but 
also of other countries with similar risk profiles. To this extent, such factors are no less important 
than sovereign credit risks as forgiveness according Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) and repayment 
‘bonus’ argued by Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) both have potentially wide-spread contagious 
influences over the international capital market. Prior to the case of Greece, previous sovereign 
defaults never involved a debtor with its home currency being a major international reserve 
currency. With this becoming more probable, the understanding of the potentially contagious 
factors mentioned above would be more important than ever for both international capital market 
and countries with outstanding, or plan to continue issuing, sovereign debt. In the past, empirical 
values of forgiveness and repayment ‘bonus’ were documented1 after default events. However, 
estimating and forecasting these factors before actual default happens becomes crucial now, as the 
impact of sovereign default may no longer be isolated if it happens in, say, the Euro zone.  
Schwartz and Zurita (1992) show in a rational expectations model how forgiveness, as well as 
potential default penalty, is taken into account in the initial sovereign loan contract. As they argue 
that the penalty can be considered in the context of international regulation, it is similar in essence 
to the repayment bonus in Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990). Debt forgiveness and repayment 
bonus are in this context forward-looking and unobservable, or unknown at the time of loan 
pricing. They also need to be learned over time, from the perspective of sub-game equilibrium in a 
multi-stage renegotiation process (see Francois, Hubner, Sibille, 2011; Hayri, 2000; Fernandez and 
                                                 
1 Hayri (2000) compares estimated and actual debt reductions under the Brady Plan, where the average reduction 
percentage is around 30% for seven countries opting for reductions. Neumayer (2002) discussed debt forgiveness, 
compiled from the Global Development Finance database of the World Bank, and its influencing variables. 
Borensztein and Panizza (2009), among others, report the imputed rise of borrowing costs. 
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Rosenthal, 1990; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989a; Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981). The time-varying nature 
of these unobservable variables prompts us to adopt a state space model, such as Kalman filter, for 
estimation and updating. Revenue flow (e.g. Hayri, 2000), foreign exchange reserves (e.g. 
Karmann and Maltritz, 2009) or GDP (e.g. Francois, Hubner and Sibille , 2011) have been used as 
the state variable in a model like this. We also choose GDP as the state variable in our Kalman 
filter model.   
The structural approach of Merton (1974) has long been applied on the valuation of sovereign 
debt. Karmann and Maltriz (2003,2009) employ directly the Black-Scholes put option formula. 
The model of Gray, Merton and Bodie (2007) apply a reduced-form version of contingent claims 
model in the context of sovereign balance sheet with a distress barrier modeled as certain 
triggering levels of liabilities. Francois, et al. (2011) extend it to a structural approach framework 
to show how sovereign credit spread react to a nation’s GDP and default threshold. Jeanneret (2013) 
builds his model also on a structural contingent claims approach, where a default boundary 
depends on tax revenue. In order to obtain reliable estimates of unobservable debt forgiveness and 
repayment bonus, we will also adopt a structural approach with an explicit barrier option formula. 
This model includes a third unobservable variable, default threshold, to reflect the strategic nature 
embedded in sovereign debt pricing. 
Our barrier option model with an embedded Down-and-In Put (DIP) written by the creditor to 
the debtor, based on the original specification of Merton (1973), employs the explicit formula of 
Reiner and Rubinstein (1991) and Rich (1994). The effective debt-load is the amount of borrowing, 
net of forgiveness expected from the creditor, which serves as the de facto exercise value2. A rebate 
for the debtor, if the put is not knocked in, can be considered as a default penalty on the debtor at 
default or a repayment bonus for not defaulting. This model is set up to utilize information 
commonly available but without measurement imperfections or ambiguity in terms of 
interpretation, such as observed sovereign yields, GDP and debt to GDP ratio, to extract implied 
expectations on debt forgiveness, repayment bonus and default threshold. The path-dependent 
nature of its valuation is compatible with game-theoretic equilibrium of sovereign debt 
negotiations, and the results are easily comparable across sovereign debtors. It is also 
straightforward to project sovereign yields with a closed-form valuation formula. 
Analysis of this study suggests that granting debt forgiveness to a debtor is more in the 
                                                 
2 Considering the amount after forgiveness as the exercise value of the put has in essence all the features of using the 
borrowing amount directly, but offers more implications in the next section. 
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interest of the creditor than offering repayment award. While forgiveness works unconditionally, a 
debtor can only receive repayment award conditional on full debt repayment, which could result in 
unfavored consequences due to moral hazard. We show in our sensitivity analysis that forgiveness 
makes sovereign debt more valuable, and the effect is more prominent as time to maturity shortens 
or repayment ability weakens. However, contrary to the prior belief of many, we find that debt 
value goes down with the magnitude of repayment bonus, as it actually raises the value of the DIP 
held by the sovereign debtor and lowers the value of debt perceived by the creditor. This seeming 
punishment to the creditor is especially stronger when the debtor performs better in the economy. 
The default threshold, which activates the DIP, does not seem to affect debt value monotonously. 
When the threshold is relatively high, a drop of it could lower the debt value due to more valuable 
DIP, which is more significant for longer maturities than shorter ones. Only when the threshold is 
relatively low, then its decrease helps to increase the value of the debt.  
Our Monte Carlo simulations results suggest that sustained growth in national income or asset 
values is the most effective way to lower financing costs for sovereign debt. At given levels of 
forgiveness, repayment bonus and default threshold are expected to fall with time to maturity, a 
sovereign debtor with only moderate economic growth may not be enough to escape from rising 
debt yields over time. On a trajectory with relatively low income growth, increasing debt 
forgiveness or repayment bonus is the only way to possibly lower future debt yields. However, on 
a path with high income growth, the effect of slightly falling forgiveness and bonus would be 
overwhelmed by income and debt yields could potentially fall. Even with high income growth, a 
default threshold falling moderately would still lower the debt value in the early part of such 
trajectory, and start raising the debt value later on. We also reexamine the argument of Krugman 
(1988), which suggests that extra financing to a heavily indebted country is distorting as compared 
to forgiveness. Simulations suggest that sovereign yields rise immediately following extra 
financing and would stay significantly higher than in the case of debt forgiveness. Extra financing 
literally pushes up the default threshold and hence the resulting yields. The knock-in feature of our 
model contributes much to the advantage of forgiveness over financing as debt value is highly 
sensitive to the ‘distance to default’.  
We adopt a Kalman filter algorithm to estimate the unobservable variables in our model, 
whose path-dependent nature also requires Bayesian updating. As our pricing model is highly 
nonlinear, we choose to apply an augmented unscented Kalman filter version according to Julier 
and Uhlmann (2004). Estimation results suggest that higher sovereign yields imply higher 
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expected repayment bonus, forgiveness and default threshold. All three unobservable variables do 
fall with time to maturity. As a robustness check, we apply the same algorithm on yields simulated 
from our barrier option pricing model for various time to maturity and find results compatible with 
those from real market data. Additionally, the forecasting errors in our model are only at fractions 
of those produced by other related studies, as our unscented Kalman filter procedure is free of 
potential econometric problems with other traditional methods. 
Our model of default threshold for sovereign debt is more tractable than existing works in 
literature, especially in the calibration of sovereign yields under various debt load levels, economic 
cycles, time to maturity and forecasting capability. Empirical analysis can be carried out easily 
based on our model as bond price is present in a closed forms. The model can be applied in the 
operation of risk management, as well as portfolio investments, for investors of sovereign debt 
instruments. Sovereigns can also benefit from this model in managing national debt load and in 
optimizing maturity, size and floating time of new issues. A brief literature review and the model 
of risk threshold is given in Section II. Data and empirical results are laid out in Section III. 
Conclusion is given in Section IV. 
 
II. A Default Threshold Model for Sovereign Debt  
 
Related Literature 
Literature on sovereign debt focuses in general on global risks, credit risks and liquidity risks. 
The main purpose of this study is on the credit risk component as the other two are either 
exogenous or determined by long-term factors. Recent evidence shows that the sharp increases of 
government bond yield spreads during the financial crisis were not caused by changes in 
macroeconomic factors, but more possibly by rising default risks. One reason for the extremely 
volatile sovereign spreads is that holders of sovereign debt often do not have recourse to a 
bankruptcy code at sovereign defaults, which in many cases are not determined by economic 
factors. The costs of sovereign defaults include reputation costs as argued in Eaton and Gersovitz 
(1981). François, Hübner, and Sibille (2011) discuss how sovereigns can negotiate with creditors 
exogenously while maintaining endogenous optimizing default decisions. Many sovereign defaults 
are prevented through negotiations or restructuring, therefore pricing issue is sensitive especially to 
risks induced by the extended long period of time.  
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Forgiveness, according to the seminal study of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), is one remedy, on 
the basis of another key element, an enforceable default penalty. Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) 
take an approach stressing only possible awards to a sovereign debtor with game-theoretic models, 
where default penalty is not considered as a credible choice. The debtor receives, on full 
repayment, a ‘bonus’, in the form of improved access to subsequent financing, from international 
capital market rather than from the creditor. In their model, a creditor would pledge first on certain 
level of debt forgiveness, in place of default penalty, to encourage the debtor not choosing to 
default. In an equilibrium, the debtor chooses repayment willingly taking into account the 
magnitude of forgiveness as well as expected repayment bonus.  
Following the early literature on debt reduction, many works of pricing formula are built on 
continuous time model with strategic default and debt reduction (see Cohen, 1993; Classens and 
van Wijnbergen, 1993; Hayri, 2000; Andrade, 2009). Further on, many works employ a 
reduced-form model with exogenously specified process of default intensity process, such as 
Merrick (2001), Duffie, Pederson and Singleton (2003) and Pan and Singleton (2008). They all 
assume that holders of sovereign debt face a single credit event of default, in the sense of Fischer, 
Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Leland (1994), and liquidation follows it.  
Among those adopting a structural model, some employ a ‘balance sheet’ contingent claims 
approach (e.g., Gapen, Gray, Lim and Xiao, 2005; Gray, Merton and Bodie, 2007; Francois, 
Hubner and Sibille , 2011), which consider public, private and banking sectors in analyzing time 
and distance to a sovereign default. Gibson and Sundaresan (2001), Westphalen (2002), and 
Andrade (2009) also apply a contingent claims framework with strategic defaults. While default is 
modeled as a choice of the debtor, depending on domestic and international macroeconomic 
environment, it is not practical to assume the debtor’s optimization scheme without allowing the 
investors to update their expectation as in models of Yue (2010) and Jeanneret (2013). 
 Sovereign debt limit is first formally introduced by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a), where a 
country’s debt capacity is limited by the extent to which creditor can impose default penalty. 
Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) argue that issuing sovereigns possess legal or political advantages in 
deterring creditors’ reclaiming moves, including payment rescheduling and renegotiation of 
payments. Hayri (2000) indicate with a continuous time framework that, whenever possible, 
creditors tend to choose larger and later debt reductions while debtors would choose smaller and 
earlier reductions. Guillard and Kempf (2012) discuss further about both default and no-default 
thresholds corresponding to the lower and upper critical values of debt levels. Beyond the default 
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threshold or the upper critical debt level, ‘effective’ debt load appears to be explosive. These 
models of debt threshold or limit, however, have few implications about how creditors can alter the 
effect of the threshold to improve their welfare. 
 
Model 
The economy we consider is open one with a representative sovereign borrower and investors 
with certain endowment and facing consumption-saving choices. Investors could either lend 
domestic or foreign currency to the sovereign borrower. The technology of currency exchange and 
the exchange rate are assumed to be given and do not change with amount or currency of 
borrowing. Both sovereigns and creditors can refer to an observable signal to achieve each party’s 
decision, rather than relying on sets of expectations formed before the issuance of debt. They can 
expect to modify each other’s decision over the life of the debt depending on changes in 
environment and that observable signal. It is natural to use debt price as the signal, and a 
satisfactory valuation scheme should be easy to understand and conveniently available. We would 
like to focus on factors influencing the expectations on the time or distance to a likely default. The 
process has to be, conforming to practice in the financial markets, irreversible such that given the 
information of this process debt price would start assuming an entirely different path. This is one 
feature different from many existing models, but it is much needed by issuing sovereigns and 
investors.   
In our model, a Down-and-In Put (DIP) is considered, according to Merton (1973) Reiner and 
Rubinstein (1991) and Rich (1994), in a framework where the issuing sovereign or the debtor 
purchases, conceptually, a DIP with exercise value at X from the investor or the creditor. In the 
literature of applying barrier option on corporate securities, a Down-and-In Call is often employed 
(e.g., Brockman and Turtle, 2003; Giesecke, 2004) as creditors of corporate debt are usually the 
ones initiating the related preservation process. However, in considering a sovereign debt Bulow 
and Rogoff (1989b) stress the active role played by the sovereign debtor. Other literature (e.g., 
Fernandez and Rosenthal, 1990; Hayri, 2000; Francois, et al., 2011) suggests that a sovereign 
debtor often makes decisions as to how much to borrow and when to or not to repay its creditors. 
In order to conduct analysis in a setting where a debt issuer takes initiative, we chose a model with 
DIP where creditors as the writer of the put are just passive in terms of altering the value of a 
sovereign debt. 
We assume D to be the amount the sovereign agrees to repay the investor T years from now 
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while X is the actual value that sovereign ends up repaying after an expected forgiveness is taken 
into account as 
DgX   (1) 
Also, there exists a default threshold H which ‘knocks in’ the DIP. The asset value of underlying 
the DIP, V, is assumed to be the GDP value of the issuing country. Similar to the argument of 
Francois, et al. (2011), V can be considered as the only relevant part of the country’s assets which 
can possibly be used in debt repayment. So the actual value of national wealth should be replaced, 
in the spirit of the model3, by the nation’s GDP. As a relevant value should be compared against the 
amount of repayment, we argue that V should be the relevant measure to monitor, and if it falls 
below H, then the DIP starts taking the value of a standard put as formulated in Black and Sholes 
(1973). The value of the debt would be the sum of discounted present value of X plus the value of a 
short put with parameters specified above. If V stays above H before maturity, then DIP maintain 
its value without changes, and the debt value would include in it a short DIP rather than a standard 
put. The value of the DIP follows, if H<X4, 
 )](-)([)/()()( 212-11)( yNyNVHVeTxNXexNVeDIP TrTTr    
)]-()/(-)-([)]()([)/( 2
22
121
2-2 TyNVHTxNKeTyNTyNVHXe rTrT     ,  (2),  
where δ is current discount rate, r is the continuously compounded interest rate. K is, in the 
practice of option trading, the rebate offered by the writer if DIP is not knocked in before maturity, 
or in our context the expected repayment bonus from the creditor. Additionally,   
2
1
2  
 r , 
T
T
XVx  
)/ln(
1
, 
                                                 
3 Among others, Claessens and Wijnbergen (1993) use expected non-oil current account, and Karmann and Maltriz 
(2009) consider foreign exchange reserves to be the ‘ability-to-pay’ measure. It is also apparent that only a small 
percentage of the measure is relevant to actual repayment. 
4 In the literature of corporate securities, H is usually assumed to be above X for simplicity, as in Brockman and Turtle 
(2003), Giesecke (2004) and Lin and Sun (2009), and it follows that 
 )]-()/(-)-([)()( 2
2
211
)( TyNVHTxNKeTxNXexNVeDIP rTrTTr     , (3)
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T
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2
. 
  9
T
T
VXHy  
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1  and   
T
T
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)/ln(
2
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The first two terms in (2) denote the value of a long position on a standard put. For a 
sovereign debt this value amounts to, in the event of a sovereign default, how the borrowing 
country evaluates its option of surrender its national income or fiscal autonomy to the creditors’ 
scrutiny in place of subsequent repayment. The following two terms are the value of the DIP 
before being knocked in, and the last term is the value of the repayment bonus promised by the 
creditor, which could also considered as a default penalty on the debtor. Although in (2) the values 
of K, g, and H have been assumed for simplicity as constant parameters regardless of values of the 
national income or debt load, the probability distribution associated with them can still affect the 
values of the DIP.  
We employ this model primarily for its explicit valuation formula and straightforward 
implications. There are two advantages of adopting this model. First, the nature of DIP brings 
along a threshold, in the spirit of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b), Hayri (2000), Bi (2010) and Guillard 
and Kempf (2012), to explain the explosively rising sovereign yields of countries with imminent 
default concerns. Another advantage for incorporating DIP debt pricing is that observed market 
yields can be fitted in this model to facilitate risk management for issuers or portfolio investors in 
sovereign debt. As creditors of the sovereign debt write to the issuer a DIP whose value is 
expressed in (2), so the creditor’s claim B would be valued as  
),,,;,,,(),,,;,,,,(  TrKVHXDIPDeTrKVHXDB rT   . (4) 
Although in our model the debtor receives an award for not defaulting prior to maturity, in the 
form of either a straight cash payment, lower borrowing rate in the future or a better credit rating, 
it could still be perceived relatively as a default penalty imposed on the defaulting sovereign debt 
issuers. The larger K is, the more the defaulting debtor would be penalized on the yield implied 
from (4), which would in turn raise the yield on its debt to be auctioned next time.   
According to the binomial approximations of Baldi, Caramellino and Iovino (1999) and 
Barone-Adesi, Fusari and Theal (2008), the approximated price of a barrier option should be 
positively related to an exit probability. The value of X in (2) affects the debtor’s exit probability, 
which according to (4) would have a different implication for the creditor. If the borrowing amount 
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D is the same as X and the debtor defaults, then higher X gives the debtor a more favorable exit and 
hence a higher DIP value. The creditor’s claim by (4) is apparently lower given this defaulting 
situation. However if, before the debtor’s income fall below the default threshold H, the creditor 
grants the debtor more forgiveness by lowering X, then it may be beneficial for both parties 
involved in this contract. The value of DIP could be higher due to a higher possibility of getting a 
repayment award, or lower due to the prospect of a less favorable exit at default5. In the latter case, 
the creditor’s claim in (2) is higher, while the lower yield implied by that would benefit the debtor 
on subsequent borrowing.  
 
Sensitive Analysis 
【Figure 1】 
Figure 1 plots, for the maturities of 1 year, 5, 10 and 20 years, sovereign yields according to 
(4) against values of expected repayment bonus at three given levels of GDP. Each of them can be 
considered respectively as representing a state with low risk (GDP=100), a state with medium risk 
(GDP=80) and a state with high risk (GDP=70). The variable k, expressed as a fraction of D, is the 
independent variable in this comparative statics analysis. Across the four sub-plots with different 
maturities, levels of expected forgiveness g, also expressed as a fraction of D, is parameterized 
such that it falls with time to maturity to fit reality. Similar treatment is done to default threshold h, 
which is expressed as a fraction of X. It is shown in Figure 1, contrary to the expectations of many, 
that sovereign yield gets higher if a larger repayment award is offered to the debtor. An explicit or 
implicit commitment to a larger repayment award the debtor increases the debtor’s incentive to 
default, as the expected vale of exercising the DIP becomes higher due to an increase of this award. 
So the inclusion of the DIP in our model for sovereign debt leads us to question the effectiveness 
of a repayment award to the debtor in the sense of Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990).   
Given different GDP levels, yields in the low risk state climb up faster than yields in the 
states with higher risks, and that gap widens as time to maturity shortens. For a maturity of 20 
years in the low risk state, an increase of repayment award from an equivalent of 0.1% to 28.9% of 
D would raise the sovereign yields by 49 basis points, from 3.35% to 3.84%. In the high risk state, 
that difference is 14 basis points. If the maturity shortens to 10 years, the gap between two states 
                                                 
5 Hayri (2000) show that a single-round strategic debt reduction game is capable of predicting non-forgiving exits 
always cause the creditor 150% more losses than debt forgiveness.  
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goes up to 111 basis points, and further up to 287 basis points for an issue with 5-year maturity. 
The difference reaches two thousand basis points for the maturity of 1 year. An imminent 28.9% 
repayment award could push the yield, in a low risk state, up to a level of 39.2%, 3,760 basis 
points higher than at the repayment award of 0.1%. While in a high risk state, that lift is only 1,755 
basis points. 
【Figure 2】 
Figure 2 plots, for various maturities, sovereign yields according against values of expected 
forgiveness in three risk states as specified above. The variable g is the independent variable in this 
comparative statics analysis. Across the sub-plots with different maturities, levels of expected 
forgiveness g and h are also parameterized to fall with time to maturity. Here sovereign yields 
drops with increases in expected debt forgiveness. As in the comparative statics analysis of k, 
yields at a certain level of g are higher for the high risk state, with an exception in the 20-year 
maturity. In a high risk state, sovereign yields are actually lower than the other two states with 
lower risks, for low values of g. This is due to an assumed higher default threshold making the 
GDP level stay below h. DIP is exercised and takes on a higher value of standard put.  
Here yields in the more risky states are also more sensitive to g, dropping faster as g increases, 
and more so as time to maturity shortens. As more forgiveness is expected by the market, a debt 
issue in the more risky state would benefit more. The exception appears when the time to maturity 
is only one year, where yields in the safest state increase, rather than decrease, in g. It happens 
because DIP is literally worthless and most of the value comes from the expected repayment award. 
When the forgiveness is expected to be over 20%, even the yields in the more risky states start 
increasing in g. For the maturities of 20, 10 and 5 years, yields in the most risky state drops 
respectively 40%, 75% and 137% faster than in the safest state. The differences between yields in 
the most and the least risky state are, respectively, 59, 95 and 171 basis points.  
【Figure 3】 
Yields against expected default thresholds are plotted in Figure 3, also separately in each of 
the three risk states. Levels of expected repayment award k and forgiveness g are still 
parameterized to fall with time to maturity. Sovereign yields decrease in expected default threshold 
at lower h values, and then start increasing in h. At relatively lower values of h, a higher threshold 
value makes DIP more valuable and the debt less valuable. As h gets beyond certain levels, a 
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higher threshold value makes DIP less valuable because the debtor gets more reluctant to surrender 
its national income. However, for shorter maturities such as 5-year and 1-year, yields are 
insensitive at very low values of default threshold. As the DIP is highly unlikely to be knocked in, 
its value is simply the sum of a standard put and the value of the expected repayment award. Over 
all, yields are lower for a default threshold at 100% of current GDP than at, say, 70% or 50%. This 
pattern is less pronounced as time to maturity shortens. 
【Figure 4】 
In Figure 4, yields at given values of k are plotted against levels of GDP separately for each of 
the four maturities. In order to see more clearly how repayment award affects the responsiveness, 
both g and h are assumed to be fixed rather than falling with time to maturity. Although yields do 
fall as GDP increases, larger k makes yields less sensitive to GDP and also brings about higher 
yields at reasonable GDP levels, uniformly across all maturities. As GDP falls, the DIP becomes 
more likely to be knocked in, so a larger k committed to the debtor causes the value of the DIP to a 
bigger drop on the benefits expected from k, resulting in a higher debt value and lower implied 
yield.   
 In the case of 1-year maturity, yields become insensitive to increases in GDP, at higher GDP 
levels. This reflects the fact that exercising the DIP is practically unlikely and the only value left in 
the DIP is the expected value of the pre-committed repayment award, which is related only to the 
face value of debt rather than GDP values. For all other maturities, the likelihood of exercising the 
DIP remains, a higher GDP value makes the DIP less valuable. But the decrease in DIP is weaker 
because a larger repayment award adds more value to the DIP.   
 【Figure 5】 
Figure 5, plots yields at given values of g against GDP for various maturities. Both k and h 
are also assumed to be the same for all maturities. Higher g results in lower yields at given income 
levels and makes yields less sensitive to GDP for shorter maturities. As GDP rises, the difference 
in yields caused by g decreases, as the debtor’s benefits on DIP falls due to a lower likelihood of 
default in the case of shorter maturities. Given indirect effect of g on yields, the direct effect is 
much stronger for shorter maturities because the same amount of forgiveness is worth much more. 
When the maturity is at 20 years, raising forgiveness from 2.24% f original debt amount to 33.54% 
lowers yields by 82 basis points, at 80% of current GDP. The benefits for the 10-year, 5-year and 
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1-year debt are 145, 247 and 345 respectively. At 50% of current GDP, the differences would rise 
sharply to 108, 223, 479 and 3,455 basis points. 
【Figure 6】 
Figure 6 gives plots of yields against GDP at given values of h. Both g and k are assumed to 
be the same for all maturities. In general, higher default threshold does not benefit the debt in its 
value, a phenomenon contrary to the belief of many. The difference is caused by the existence of 
DIP. As a debtor’s GDP stay further above the level of expected threshold, DIP becomes less 
valuable. For all maturities, if the threshold is 89% then the effective debt amount would be 52% 
of current GDP, where the embedded DIP gets exercised and yields rise sharply below that level of 
GDP. If h equals 0.67, then DIP knocks in only below 39% of current GDP. As the value of a 
standard put decreases with time to maturity, so does the knock-in value of DIP. The differences in 
yields caused by h thus goes down with time to maturity as well. 
For the maturity of 20 years, if the default threshold goes down from 89.44% of effective debt 
amount to 53.67%, yields would be raised by 35 basis points, at 80% of current GDP. The 
consequence on the 10-year and 5-year maturities would be, respectively, 58, and 66. It drops to 9 
basis points only for the 1-year maturity due to the extreme loss of time value. At 54% of current 
GDP, the differences would go up to 43, 93, 169 and 231 basis points for the four maturities. 
 
Simulations 
The sensitive analysis above gives static relations among sovereign yields and repayment 
award, debt forgiveness and default threshold. In order to conduct a dynamic exploration, 
preliminary to our subsequent empirical analysis, on the variables of interest, we simulate 
projected paths for yields of a sovereign debt with 20 years to maturity over the next 60 months. 
Raw yields are calculated using (4) and randomized to obtain simulated yields, which are also 
generated with a lognormal random generator with standard deviations falling with time to 
maturity. For the first month on the path, the standard deviation of the yield is set at 0.54%, and it 
is set at 0.51% for the 60th month. Simulation is carried out one thousand times and the average is 
reported. For the three variables of interest, we conduct simulations twice, with one assuming a 6% 
growth of GDP and 1.5% growth for the other. 
【Figure 7】 
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Trajectories of simulated yields with 6% GDP growth are plotted in Figure 7 for each of the 
three scenarios with different paths of k. The first is one where increases rapidly at an annual pace 
of 33% from its current level of 0.074, while in the second scenario k rises steadily at roughly 17% 
a year. The last one is when k goes up slowly at a pace of 5.6% annually. Each of the three paths is 
simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and standard deviation 
being 25% of it. It is shown in Figure 7(a) that the effect of rising k, which is supposed to drive up 
yields, is offset by income growth. When k is barely rising, the average simulated yields actually 
drop throughout the first 45 months before starting to go up slowly. It is the strong growth of GDP 
that overwhelms k over two-thirds of projected paths. Yields are able to maintain unchanged if k 
increases at the moderate pace, which is just enough to offset income growth. Even if k is expected 
to rise, for the purpose of exploration, in the first scenario at an incredible pace of 33% annually, 
yields could not start rising before the 25th month due to the strong income growth.   
 The bottom panel of Figure 7 plots projected yields given a mere GDP growth of 1.5%. As 
weaker income is not enough anymore to overwhelm the effect of rising k, all three scenarios 
exhibit rising yields. Yield in the first scenario ends up with a gain of 19%, about 10% short of its 
counterpart in 7(a) due to a 30% lower ending income level. But it goes all the way up there 
without going down first. The same results hold for the other two scenarios, where one gains 7.7% 
and the other is up by 2.8%, with neither going through apparent periods of falling yields.  
【Figure 8】 
Figure 8 gives the plots of three simulated scenarios, two with falling g, and one with 
increased debt amount to verify the conclusion of Krugman (1988). The first is one where g rises 
slowly at 8.6% annually from its current level of 0.071, while in the second scenario g increases 
rapidly at an annual pace of 42%. In the last one, in addition to g falling at 42%, we let the debt 
amount go up by 5% whenever the default threshold happens to increase 20% over its value in the 
previous month. This scenario is set up to explore the extra financing alternative against simple 
forgiveness, as part of our verification of Krugman (1988). Each of the three paths is simulated 
with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and standard deviation being 15% 
of it.  
The top panel Figure 7(a) contains plots on a 6% GDP growth. It is shown in that the effect of 
falling g, which is supposed to drive up yields, is offset by the strong income growth. When the 
forgiveness is expected to be go down over time in the first scenario, instead of rising, the average 
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simulated yield drops by 4% in the end. Even when the forgiveness expectation falls rapidly in the 
second scenario, average yields manage to increase just slightly by a mere 4%. In the last scenario, 
we simulate under a scheme where 5% extra financing is granted whenever default threshold is 20% 
higher the in the previous month. Without any change on forgiveness, rising debt amount would 
drive yields up by 5.6%, which is even worse for the debtor than forgiveness being withdrawn 42% 
annually. This is another support for the Krugman (1988) argument that forgiveness works better 
than extra financing, for the creditor’s consideration. 
 The bottom panel of Figure 8 plots projected yields given a mere GDP growth of 1.5%. As 
weaker income is not enough anymore to overwhelm the effect of falling g, an 8.75% annual drop 
of g is able to drive up the yield by 6.6%, compared with a drop of 4% in 8(a) under strong income 
growth. If g goes down much faster at 42% annually then the yield would go up by 18%. When we 
apply the same analysis as in 8(a) on the Krugman argument, we find the ending yield to be just 
about the same as in the second scenario. The effect of extra financing is equivalent to 
withdrawing forgiveness significantly on the debtor, from 26% to 3% of debt amount, within a 
five-year period. 
【Figure 9】 
To see how simulated yields are driven by changes of default threshold, we plot the results 
from three scenarios about h in Figure 9. In the first one, h is assumed to rise slowly at 1.7% 
annually from its current level of 0.71. In the second scenario h goes down moderately at 8.8% per 
year, and more rapidly at 33% in the third one. The top panel is based on a 6% GDP growth, where 
rising h in the first scenario causes the yields to drop by 10%, verifying the predictions given by 
comparative statics in Figure 3 and 6. Even when h falls moderately, due to the strong growth of 
GDP, yield would still drop and end up almost 5% lower than where it starts. Only when h goes 
down rapidly as in the third scenario could the yield increase by about 6% before declining after 
the thirty-sixth month and drop to 1% below the starting yield level. So the results in this panel 
indicates that the effect of an embedded DIP makes it extremely hard for the default threshold to 
push yields up, even when the threshold falls extremely fast over time.  
 The bottom panel of Figure 9 plots projected yields given a mere GDP growth of 1.5%. As 
weaker income growth is not enough anymore to overwhelm the effect of falling h, yields for all 
three scenarios increase over time. Along with the weak income growth, a slowly rising h at 1.2% 
annually would result in a 2% higher ending yield. But if h goes down at an annual rate of 8.6%, 
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the yield would rise to 6.9% higher than at the start, a difference of 37 basis points. Furthermore, if 
h should fall rapidly in the third scenario, then Figure 9(a) shows that yields could go up by around 
15% up to the 40th month before dropping a little afterwards, when higher GDP makes DIP less 
valuable and pushes down yields.    
The simulation results suggest that GDP growth plays a crucial role in the paths of future 
sovereign yields. A strong growth often overwhelms potential influences especially from either 
repayment award or default threshold. In the absence of potential positive contribution of income 
growth, sovereign yields tend to go up with k and h, but go down with g. Forgiveness seems to be 
the most effective approach to prevent deteriorating sovereign yields, while the effect of the other 
two depends on their own dynamics and also income growth.   
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
 
The Data 
Our sample comprises monthly bond yield data obtained from Datastream from 2003 to 2013, 
covering 7 countries and 698 yield series. The shortest series covers around four years, while the 
longest spans across 11 years. All the sovereign yields are calculated from month-end prices of 
zero-coupon government bonds traded in the data collection period. The average time to maturity 
is between 9 to 15 years. Some of them are OECD countries while others are not. All but Mexico 
and Israel are from the European Union area. Annual GDP growth data is from World Bank. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table I.  
【Table I】 
Table I shows that, for the average yields of Mexico are the highest among all. On observed 
standard deviations, yields from Spain and Italy appear to be the most volatile during this period. 
Apparently, compared with Italy, Spain has a problem of sharply declining GDP, which could be 
reflected by our simulation carried out earlier. While for Italy, short term volatility on its 
debt-to-GDP ratio rapidly pushes default threshold toward current income level and causes 
panicking pricing responses in 2011. 
 
Unscented Kalman Filter estimation 
The theoretical model introduced above in (2) and (3) in non-linear in a complex way. 
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Although k, g, and h are the main driving variables in (4), they are unobservable. So regression 
models are not feasible choice. To cope with corporate bond yields modeled as nonlinear functions 
of underlying state variables, Duffee (1999) adopt Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) recursions for 
estimation. Julier and Uhlmann (2004) argue, however, that EKF may suffer serious problems 
while executing algorithms, which include error propagation (Lerro and Bar-Shalom, 1993; Costa, 
1994), the non-existence and the calculation of Jacobian matrix (Kastella, Kouritzin and Zatezalo, 
1996). We therefore adopt the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) introduced by Julier and Uhlmann 
(2004) to overcome the potential technical difficulties in applying EKF. Information on the model 
is in the Appendix. 
Table II reports the results of an augmented UKF algorithm on the barrier-option model in (2). 
The scheme of creating sigma points according to Julier and Uhlmann (2004) has been modified to 
accommodate the non-negativity requirement of yields. The state dynamic function is a simple 
mean-reverting process, while the measurement process applies directly from (2). The discount 
rate δ in (2) is assumed to be at 2%. The continuous interest rate is approximated by the short rate 
of each respective country. The volatility parameter is calculated with quarterly GDP of each 
country. GDP values are deflated first by figures for the year of 2002 and then scaled to 100. The 
face value of debt is the government debt to GDP ratio times 100. The theoretical values of the 
three unknown state variables are generated randomly, with priors filtered on simulated yields 
through similar UKF procedures whose results are presented in Table V, and are also assumed to be 
mean-reverting. 
【Table II】 
The augmented UKF procedure is executed for each country all the issues available in the data 
set for the years between 2003 and 2012. For instance, there are 208 issues from France, 90 from 
Italy and 47 from Spain, among others. Estimates for k, g and h are averaged over the 120 months 
in the estimation period and also over all the issues of a given country, and standard deviations and 
other statistics are calculated accordingly. The starting values of k, g, and h are therefore set at 0.05, 
0.1 and 0.5 respectively. 
It is shown that in general the yield data as we have collected appear to suggest that safer 
sovereign debt would produce lower estimates on the unobservable state variables of repayment 
award, forgiveness as well as default threshold. Germany appears to have the lowest average 
estimates, with k, g, and h at 0.0221, 0.0374 and 0.5641 respectively. Spain and Mexico appear to 
have the highest estimates, where on the implied repayment award of the former is about three and 
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half times that of Germany and around seven times for the latter. While the estimates for Mexico 
on the implied forgiveness is close to eight times that of Germany, the implied default threshold is, 
however, only around two and half times. Comparison of information in Table I and II indicates 
that the debt-to-GDP ratio is not an ideal indicator of sovereign risks. Italy has a ratio much higher 
than Spain, but their sovereign yields are quite close to each other. Our UKF estimates suggest that 
Spain have higher risks in all three aspects. Another similar comparison is between Netherlands 
and Israel. Although the latter has a higher debt ratio, its average sovereign yield is lower, in part 
due to shorter average maturity. The UKF estimates in Table II indicates that Netherlands appear to 
be less risky between the two.  
Also reported in Table II are the population standard deviations of the three state variables, 
from P in (A.6). The averages of estimated state variable are in general five to 6 times larger for all 
countries, indicating their statistical significances. It is also shown in Table II that the standard 
errors for individual estimates are only five to ten percent of the averages. As the parameters for 
these sovereign debt are not stable by nature, resorting to methods such as regressions would 
produce biased observations on how to perceive the pricing and risks of sovereign debt. With the 
kind of efficiency obtained in the UKF algorithms, we would be able to generate further simulated 
forecasts and provide meaningful inferences using this new model of sovereign debt pricing. 
【Table III】 
In the forgoing analysis, UKF estimation is carried out separately for every single unmatured 
issue of each country in the data set. As these concurrent issues of a given country share certain 
systematic characteristics, it would be more desirable to conduct an estimation on the states of all 
issues simultaneously. The Interactive Multiple Model (IMM) version of Kalman filter, proposed 
by Bar-Shalom, Li and Kirubarajan (2001), is one model available to us. Although similar to a 
panel regression model, it deals with unobservable independent variables model, and is rarely seen 
in literature6 of fixed income. This method is especially ideal for analyzing bond market, where 
overlapping issues coexist. The IMM algorithm, along with the UKF modification for a standard 
Kalman filter, is specified in the Appendix. For each country, we apply the IMM-UKF method, 
using the same parameters for Table II, on all the issues simultaneously. 
The IMM-UKF filter produces, in each month for a given country, combined or 
probability-weighted estimates for state mean and covariance matrix. Table III reports, also for the 
                                                 
6 Duffee (1999) estimates 169extended Kalman filter problems for default-free and defaultable term structure. The 
estimations are carried separately although some independent variables are common to all.  
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years between 2003 and 2012, the combined estimates for k, g and h, averaged over the 120 
months in the estimation period. The estimated standard deviation of k and the scatteredness of 
estimates across time are both smaller under IMM-UKF, confirming its efficiency in information 
utilization. But the average estimated mean of k becomes larger under the IMM-UKF filter, 
indicating that the repayment award appears to be more influential when all outstanding issues are 
jointly considered. In the cases of g and h, estimated means are both smaller under IMM-UKF, 
suggesting the individual UKF procedure could have overestimated them in Table II. The 
variations of the estimates are, however, still uniformly lower under IMM-UKF than individual 
UKF.  
 
IV. Robustness analysis and related discussions  
Performance gains with UKF and IMM-UKF 
To justify the use of UKF in this study, instead of a more commonly adopted Extended 
Kalman Filter (EKF) estimation method, we apply both on the same set of data and compare the 
differences in forecasting performances. One-period forecasting performances of UKF and 
IMM-UKF are compared against those form an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) algorithm. 
Estimations are produced, for each month in 2013, using the previous 60 months, and one-month 
ahead forecasted yields for each month in 2013 are compared against observed yields. 22 yield 
series with maturity less than a year are excluded. The remaining 676 series are divided into 4 
maturity groups, with 96 having the maturity between 1 and 5, 188 between 6 and 10, 274 between 
11 and 15 and 218 between 16 and above. For each maturity group, Root Mean Squared Errors 
(RMSE) and Mean Absolute Errors (MAE) are calculated monthly for all issues over 2013, and 
expressed in terms of basis points in Table IV. 
It can be seen from Table IV that UKF and IMM-UKF are both superior to EKF in forecasting 
performance, either based on RMSE or MAE. Particularly, IMM-UKF has an edge of 9% over 
UKF, and 21% over EKF for the longest maturity, while for the shortest maturity the edges are 3.5% 
and 12.7% respectively. Both forecasting performance measures also indicate all three filtering 
algorithms produce smaller forecasting errors compared with Jeanneret (2013), Yue (2010) and 
Francois, et al. (2011). Examining a period similar to ours, Jeanneret (2013) report an average 
RMSE between observed and model sovereign spreads at 170 basis points for emerging markets, 
and 72 for 5 European countries. While the differences in credit spreads between observed and 
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modeled Argentina yields in Yue (2010) are between 200 to 400 basis points, the model-implied 
Brazilian yields in Francois, et al. (2011) are about 150 basis points away from the observed 
spreads. The average RMSE for maturities between 6 and 15 years is only 55 bps under the 
IMM-UKF algorithm, and 59 bps under UKF. This indicates that, with the help of efficient 
estimation procedures, the three state variables help capturing well the dynamics of sovereign 
yields through a realistic valuation model.    
Reliability of estimates using market data 
The UKF procedures introduced in the previous section are carried out are primarily on debt 
issues all with different time to maturity, which creates a high level of noise in results. As the 
values of all three state variables should decrease in time to maturity, the averages reported in 
Table II and III are affected essentially by the average time to maturity of the country of interest. 
Comparisons across countries may not reflect differences in sovereign risks. As a robustness check 
on the results reported in Table II and III, we have created separately simulated yield data using (4) 
for given time to maturity and carry out the UKF procedure for alternative estimates. In this stage 
of simulation, the discount rate is also assumed to be at 2%, and short rate is set at 1.5%, GDP growth 
volatility at 25% and debt to GDP ratio at 75%. For the simulation, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.7 are assumed as priors 
for k, g and h to start the filtering process with. They are further randomized and substituted into (4) to 
obtain raw yields. For each maturity, twenty thousand simulated yields are generated with a lognormal 
distribution having the raw yield of respective maturity as its mean. For the maturity of 20 years, simulated 
yields average at 5.48% with a standard error at 0.74%, compared with lower average yields from Italy and 
Spain and their much higher standard errors. The average simulated yields are 3.71%, 2.97% and 1.34% for 
the 10-year, 5-year and 1-year debt. The standard errors are 0.62% , 0.38% and 0.19% respectively. 
  【Table V】 
  In Table V, it is shown that the estimated repayment award for the maturity of 20 years is 0.08 
and 0.085 under UKF and IMM-UKF respectively, which are higher than the estimates for Italy 
and Spain, but lower than those for Mexico, in Table II and III. Considering the average time to 
maturity of around 14 years for issues from the two countries, the estimates in Table V is 
comparably reasonable. Similar situations apply for the estimates of debt forgiveness and default 
threshold. With the overwhelmingly large data size, this exploration suggests that the actual values 
of the three unobservable variables should be within certain range of the levels given by Table II 
and III. The average maturity, the number of issues outstanding and the actual market conditions 
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all contribute to the variability of them. 
  【Table VI】 
 To verify the relevancy of the k, g and h in our analysis, we further regress the changes of 
5-year sovereign CDS spreads on the changes in averaged estimates for k, g and h under UKF, and 
the combined estimates under IMM-UKF. The results are reported in Table VI, which suggest that, 
under both UKF and IMM-UKF, higher expected debt forgiveness for a given county pushes up 
CDS spreads. In the case of France, each additional percentage of expected debt forgiveness could 
make its 5-year CDS go up by 8 bps. While for Mexico, the effect goes down to only 4 bps, 
probably related to the fact that the expected debt forgiveness is already as high as 30%. Under 
IMM-UKF, both the expected repayment award and default threshold also influence CDS spreads 
in a significant way, only with smaller magnitudes.   
Alternative Default Threshold 
Our current model assumes the threshold to be below the exercise value of the debt. We have 
conducted related analysis on the case where the threshold is above the exercise value. The 
resulting knock-in effect becomes less apparent compared with the current model. The benefits of 
repayment award, forgiveness and default threshold are also less significant and become less 
conclusive in certain situations. The general outcome still holds in that forgiveness is the most 
effective in relieving the debtor’s burden especially when default is more imminent. Also, 
forgiveness would still work as better alternative than financing. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We introduced in this study a model of sovereign debt with an embedded DIP to capture the 
discontinuity of pricing response along observed debt-to-GDP ratios, and also to explain the 
behavior of yield volatility with the incorporation of repayment award, debt forgiveness and 
default threshold. We show that, in the context of debt negotiation, debt forgiveness is the most 
effective alternative in preventing sovereign yields from exploding over the course of debt crisis. 
Repayment bonus or award in the sense of Fernandez and Rosenthal (1990) or the capital market 
exclusion penalty as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) would not be preferred. The existence of DIP 
explains how that would invite moral hazard and push up yields, contrary to the creditor’s initial 
intention. 
  22
Our comparative statics and simulated projections indicate that while forgiveness helps 
lowering sovereign yields, neither raising repayment nor lowering default threshold is constructive 
in keeping yields down. Our estimates obtained from an Unscented Kalman Filter suggest, 
however, that smaller repayment award, debt forgiveness or default threshold coexist with lower 
sovereign risks7. The repayment capability of a less risky country or debtor is reflected with the 
fact that market as a whole would assign low values of repayment award, debt forgiveness or 
default threshold. While forgiveness works unconditionally, a debtor can only receive repayment 
award conditional on full debt repayment, which could result in unfavored consequences due to 
moral hazard. As a forward-looking perspective, offering repayment award to, or attempting to 
lower default threshold on, a debtor would not be in the interest of a creditor. But granting more 
forgiveness is beneficial always. 
Overall, our analysis shows that a strong growth in GDP is, beyond any negotiation strategies, 
the most effective solution to lower long-run sovereign yields. In the absence of that, we 
reexamine the argument of Krugman (1988), which suggests that extra financing to a heavily 
indebted country is distorting as compared to forgiveness. We show in our analysis that extra 
financing literally pushes the default threshold toward the country’s current income level and 
results in yields always higher than those under forgiveness. The knock-in feature of our model 
contributes much to the advantage of forgiveness over financing as debt value is highly sensitive to 
any income drop when default is imminent. To the debtor, forgiveness is better than extra financing 
granted from the creditors, regardless of the distance between current income and default 
threshold. 
The forecasting errors in our model are only at fractions of those produced by other related 
studies, as our unscented Kalman filter procedure is free of potential econometric problems with 
other traditional methods. Our model of default threshold for sovereign debt is more tractable than 
existing works in literature, especially in the calibration of sovereign yields under various debt 
load levels, economic cycles, time to maturity and forecasting capability. Empirical analysis can be 
carried out easily based on our model as bond price is presented in a closed form. The model can 
be applied in the operation of risk management, as well as portfolio investments, for investors of 
sovereign debt instruments. Sovereigns can also benefit from this model in managing national debt 
load and in optimizing maturity, size and floating time of new issues. 
                                                 
7 This is consistent with results of Yue (2010), whose model predicts that increasing bargaining power on the debtor 
would raise credit spreads on its sovereign debt. 
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Appendix 
 
The Unscented Kalman filter (UKF) 
The unscented transformation (UT) (Julier and Uhlmann, 2004;Wan and van der Merwe,2001) 
can be used for forming a Gaussian approximation to the joint distribution of random variables x 
and y, which are defined with equations (A.1), 
ܠ~Nሺܕ, ۾ሻ and  
ܡ ൌ ܏ሺܠሻ,  (A.1) 
where x∈Rn, y∈Rm , and g: Rn,→Rm is a nonlinear function. In UT, a fixed number of sigma 
points are deterministically choose to capture the desired moments (at least mean and covariance) 
of the original distribution of x exactly. The sigma points are propagated subsequently through the 
non-linear function g and moments of the transformed variable are estimated accordingly. The 
advantage of UT over the Taylor series based approximation is that the former is better at capturing 
the higher order moments caused by the non-linear transform. Under UT, the Jacobian and Hessian 
matrices are not needed, and therefore the estimation is easier and more error-free.  
The unscented Kalman filter (UKF) (Julier et al., 1995; Julier and Uhlmann, 2004b; Wan and 
van der Merwe, 2001) makes use of UT described above to give a Gaussian approximation to the 
filtering solutions of non-linear optimal filtering problems of form 
ܠ࢑ ൌ ܎ሺܠ࢑ି૚, k െ 1ሻ ൅ ܙ࢑ି૚ 
ܡ࢑ ൌ ܐሺܠ࢑, kሻ ൅ ܚ࢑,  (A.2) 
where xk∈Rn is the vector of unobservable state variables. In the context of our estimation, x = 
(k,g,h). yk∈Rm is the measurement vector, denoting yields implied by (1) through (3) combined. 
qk-1 ~N(0,Qk-1) is the Gaussian process noise and rk ~N(0,Rk) is the Gaussian measurement noise. 
 According to UT, the UKF algorithm consists of the prediction and update phases. In the 
prediction phase, predicted state mean ܕ௞ି  and predicted covariance matrix of state variables ۾௞ି  
are computed as   
܆࢑ି૚ ൌ ሾܕ௞ିଵ  … ܕ௞ିଵሿ ൅ √cሾඥ۾௞ିଵ  … ඥ۾௞ିଵሿ 
܆෡࢑ ൌ fሺ܆௞ିଵ, ݇ െ 1ሻ 
ܕ௞ି ൌ ܆෡௞ܟ୫ 
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۾௞ି ൌ ܆෡௞܅ሾ܆෡௞ሿ் ൅ ۿ௞ିଵ. (A.3) 
In the update phase, predicted state mean ߤ௞, measurement covariance matrix ܁௞and 
cross-covariance of the state and measurement ۱௞ are computed as 
܆௞ି ൌ ሾܕ௞ି  … ܕ௞ି ሿ ൅ √cሾඥ۾௞ି  … ඥ۾௞ି ሿ 
܇௞ି ൌ ܐሺ܆௞ି , ݇ሻ 
ߤ௞ ൌ ܇௞ି ܟ୫ 
܁௞ ൌ ܇௞ି ܅ሾ܇௞ି ሿ் ൅ ܀௞ 
۱௞ ൌ ܆௞ି ܅ሾ܇௞ି ሿ் ൅ ܀௞. (A.4) 
To finish, the algorithm would compute the filter gain ۹௞and updated state mean ܕ௞, as well as 
the state covariance matrix ۾௞as  
۹௞ ൌ ۱௞܁௞ି ଵ 
ܕ௞ ൌ ܕ௞ି ൅ ۹௞ሾ࢟௞ െ ࣆ௞ሿ 
۾௞ ൌ ۾௞ି െ ۹௞܁௞۹௞ࢀ. (A.5) 
The model above can also be modified to form an augmented state variable, which 
concatenates the state and noise components together, so that the effect of process and 
measurement noises can be used to better capture the odd-order moment information. If new sigma 
points are generated in the update step the augmented approach would give the same results as the 
nonaugmented, if we had assumed that the noises were additive. If the noises are not additive the 
augmented version should produce more accurate estimates than the nonaugmented version, even if new 
sigma points are created during the update step. The differences between the augmented algorithm and 
the original model is as follows, 
 ܠ෤௞ିଵ ൌ ሾܠ௞ିଵ்  ܙ௞ିଵ்   ܚ௞ିଵ் ሿ (augmented state variable) 
܆෩௞ିଵ ൌ ሾܕ෥ ௞ିଵ … ܕ෥ ௞ିଵሿ ൅ √c ቂඥ۾෩௞ିଵ  … ඥ۾෩௞ିଵቃ ሺmatrix of sigma points),  (A.6) 
where  
ܕ෥ ௞ିଵ ൌ ሾܕ௞ିଵ்  ૙ ૙ሿ and ۾෩௞ିଵ ൌ ൥
۾௞ିଵ ૙ ૙૙ ۿ௞ିଵ ૙૙ ૙ ܀௞ିଵ
൩ .  (A.7) 
The predicted state mean ܕ௞ି  and covariance matrix ۾௞ି  would then be computed as 
܆෡࢑ ൌ fሺ܆௞ିଵ࢞ , ܆௞ିଵࢗ , ݇ െ 1ሻ 
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ܕ௞ି  ൌ ܆෡௞ܟ୫ 
۾௞ି ൌ ܆෡௞܅ሾ܆෡௞ሿ்,  (A.8) 
where the sigma points of actual state variables and process noise are ܆௞ିଵ࢞  and ܆௞ିଵࢗ  
respectively. In the update stage, except that ߤ௞ retains the same functional form,we have instead 
܇௞ି ൌ ܐሺ܆෡௞, ܆௞ିଵ࢘ , ݇ሻ 
܁௞ ൌ ܇௞ି ܅ሾ܇௞ି ሿ் 
۱௞ ൌ ܆௞ି ܅ሾ܇௞ି ሿ் ൅ ܀௞. (A.9) 
The filter gain, update state mean and covariance matrix would retain the same functional from as 
(A.6). 
 
The Interactive Multiple Model (IMM) filter 
If we are to estimate a system with multiple models, which takes the form 
ܠ࢑ ൌ ܎࢐ሺܠ࢑ି૚, k െ 1ሻ ൅ ܙ࢑ି૚࢐  
ܡ࢑ ൌ ܐ࢐ሺܠ࢑, kሻ ൅ ܚ௞௝,  (A.10) 
where j denotes a specific model within the system. This system could be estimated with the 
Interactive Multiple Model (IMM) filter according to Bar-Shalom et al (2001). For a Markovian 
switching system like (A.10), IMM is considered an efficient algorithm for simultaneously 
estimating multiple dynamic processes. There are three phases in IMM for each time step, with the 
first one being the interaction or mixing phase. Here state estimates produced by all filters from the 
previous time step are mixed to yield the initial conditions of this step, assuming that this mixed 
model is the correct model at this step. In the second phase, regular Kalman filtering for each 
individual model is estimated, and followed by computing a weighted sum of updated individual 
state estimates by respective filters, with weights conforming to probabilities of individual models 
obtained in the filtering phase. The weighted computation, or the combination phase, then gives, 
for this particular time step, the final estimate for the mean and covariance of the Gaussian density. 
In the interaction phase, the mixing probabilities µ௞௜|௝ for each model ܯ௜ and ܯ௝ ,at the 
current step, are calculated as 
ఫܿഥ ൌ ∑ ݌௜௝ߤ௞ିଵ௜௡௜ୀଵ , (A.11) 
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µ௞௜|௝ ൌ ଵ௖ണഥ ݌௜௝ߤ௞ିଵ௜ , (A.12) 
where ߤ௞ିଵ௜  is the probability of model ܯ௜ in the time step k-1 and ఫܿഥ  is a normalization factor. 
Mixing the means and covariances each filter j is done by 
ܕ௞ିଵ଴௝ ൌ ∑ µ௞௜|௝ܕ௞ିଵ௜௡௜ୀଵ , (A.13) 
۾௞ିଵ଴௝ ൌ ∑ µ௞௜|௝ ൈ ቄ۾௞ିଵ௜ ൅ ൣܕ௞ିଵ௜ െ ܕ௞ିଵ଴௝ ൧ൣܕ௞ିଵ௜ െ ܕ௞ିଵ଴௝ ൧
்ቅ௡௜ୀଵ , (A.14) 
where ݉௞ିଵ௜  and ۾௞ିଵ௜  are the updated mean and covariance for model i at time step k-1. 
The filtering phase for UKF requires, for each model ܯ௜, filtering is carried out as 
ൣܕ௞ି,௜, ۾௞ି,௜൧ ൌ KF௣൫ܕ௞ିଵ଴௝ , ۾௞ିଵ଴௝ , ۿ௞ିଵ௜ ൯ (A.13) 
ൣܕ௞௜ , ۾௞௜ ൧ ൌ KF௨൫ܕ௞ି,௜, ۾௞ି,௜, ݕ௞, ܀௞௜ ൯, (A.14) 
where KF௣  and KF௨  are the prediction and update steps according to (A.3) and (A.4) 
respectively. The likelihood of the measurement for each filter is also computed as 
Λ௞௜ ൌ ܰ൫ܞ௞௜ ; 0, ܁௞௜ ൯, (A.15) 
where ܞ௞௜  is the residual of the measurement and ܁௞௜  is the covariance matrix for model ܯ௜ in 
(A.14). At the current time step k, the probability µ௞௜  for model ܯ௜ is calculated as 
µ௞௜ ൌ ଵ௖ ∑ Λ௞௜ ܿపഥ௡௜ୀଵ , (A.16) 
where c is a normalizing factor and given by 
c ൌ ∑ Λ௞௜ ܿపഥ௡௜ୀଵ , (A.17) 
In the combination phase, the probability-weighted estimate for the state mean and covariance 
are given by 
ܕ௞ ൌ ∑ µ௞௜ ܕ௞௜௡௜ୀଵ , (A.18) 
۾௞ ൌ ∑ µ௞௜ ൈ ቄ۾௞௜ ൣܕ௞௜ െ ܕ௞൧ൣܕ௞௜ െ ܕ௞൧்ቅ௡௜ୀଵ . (A.19) 
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    1(a) 20 years to maturity    1(b) 10 years to maturity 
 
 
 
 
   1(c) 5 years to maturity    1(d) 1year to maturity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Sovereign debt yields against repayment bonus values at various levels of GDP 
The level of repayment bonus (k) is expressed as proportions of original debt amount (D). The level of expected debt 
forgiveness (g) is expressed as proportions of D, while default threshold (h) is a proportion of X, the amount of debt 
after taking expected forgiveness into account. Levels of GDP are percentages of current value. Levels of g and h have 
been parameterized such that they decrease with time to maturity.   
 
   2(a) 20 years to maturity    2(b) 10 years to maturity 
 
 
 
 
   2(c) 5 years to maturity    2(d) 1year to maturity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sovereign debt yields against expected forgiveness values at various levels of GDP 
The level of expected forgiveness (g) is expressed as proportions of original debt amount (D). Levels of k and h have 
been parameterized such that they decrease with time to maturity.   
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   3(a) 20 years to maturity    3(b) 10 years to maturity 
 
 
 
 
   3(c) 5 years to maturity    3(d) 1year to maturity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Sovereign debt yields against default threshold values at various levels of GDP 
The level of default threshold (h) is expressed as proportions of original debt amount (D). Levels of k and g have been 
parameterized such that they decrease with time to maturity.   
 
   4(a) 20 years to maturity    4(b) 10 years to maturity 
 
 
 
 
   4(c) 5 years to maturity    4(d) 1year to maturity 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Sovereign debt yields against GDP values at various levels of repayment bonus 
Levels of GDP on the horizontal axis are relative to a current level of 100. Levels of g and h have been parameterized 
such that they decrease with time to maturity.   
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   5(a) 20 years to maturity    5(b) 10 years to maturity 
 
 
 
 
   5(c) 5 years to maturity    5(d) 1year to maturity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sovereign debt yields against GDP values at various levels of expected forgiveness 
Levels of GDP on the horizontal axis are relative to a current level of 100. Levels of k and h have been parameterized 
such that they decrease with time to maturity.   
 
   6(a) 20 years to maturity    6(b) 10 years to maturity 
 
 
 
 
   6(c) 5 years to maturity    6(d) 1year to maturity 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Sovereign debt yields against GDP values at various levels of default threshold 
Levels of GDP on the horizontal axis are relative to a current level of 100. Levels of k and g have been parameterized 
such that they decrease with time to maturity.   
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 20 Years to Maturity with GDP growing at 6%, g=0.27, h=0.71 
 
 
 
 20 Years to Maturity with GDP growing at 1.5%, g=0.27, h=0.71 
 
Figure 7: Sixty-month simulations of yields in response to changes of repayment award 
Trajectories of simulated debt yields are plotted for the next 60 months for three scenarios with different paths of k. 
The first is one where increases rapidly at an annual pace of 33% from its current level of 0.074, while in the second 
scenario k rises steadily at roughly 17% a year. The last one is when k goes up slowly at a pace of 5.6% annually. Each 
of the three paths is simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and standard deviation 
being 25% of it. Raw yields are calculated using (4) and randomized to obtain simulated yields, which are also 
generated with a lognormal random generator with standard deviations falling with time to maturity. For the first 
month on the path, the standard deviation of the yield is set at 0.54%, and it is set at 0.51% for the 60th month. 
Simulation is carried out one thousand times and the average is reported.  
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20 Years to Maturity, with GDP growing at 6%, k=0.071, h=0.71 
 
   
20 Years to Maturity, with GDP growing at 1.5%, k=0.071, h=0.71 
 
Figure 8: Sixty-month simulations of yields in response to changes of debt forgiveness 
Trajectories of simulated debt yields are plotted for the next 60 months for three scenarios with different paths of g. 
The first is one where g rises slowly at 8.6% annually from its current level of 0.071, while in the second scenario g 
increases rapidly at an annual pace of 42%. In the last one, in addition to g falling at 42%, we let the debt amount go 
up by 5% whenever the default threshold happens to increase 20% over its value in the previous month. This scenario 
is set up to explore the extra financing alternative against simple forgiveness, as part of our verification of Krugman 
(1988). Each of the three paths is simulated with a lognormal distribution with the current level of k as mean and 
standard deviation being 15% of it. Raw yields are calculated using (4) and randomized further to obtain simulated 
yields with a lognormal random generator with standard deviations specified as for the simulations plotted in Figure 7. 
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20 Years to Maturity, with GDP growing at 6%, k=0.071, g=0.22 
 
   
20 Years to Maturity, with GDP growing at 1.5%, k=0.071, g=0.22 
 
Figure 9: Sixty-month simulations of yields in response to changes of default threshold 
Trajectories of simulated debt yields are plotted for the next 60 months for three scenarios with different paths of h. In 
the first one, h is assumed to rise slowly at 1.7% annually from its current level of 0.71. In the second scenario h goes 
down moderately at 8.8% per year, and more rapidly at 33% in the third one. Each of the three paths is simulated with 
a lognormal distribution with the current level of h as mean and standard deviation being 30% of it. Raw yields are 
calculated using (4) and randomized further to obtain simulated yields with a lognormal random generator with 
standard deviations specified as for the simulations plotted in Figure 7. 
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Table I  Summary Statistics of Zero-coupon Government Bond Yields 
Monthly implied zero-coupon bond yields are obtained from Datastream for the period between January 2003 
and December 2012, covering 7 countries and 698 yield series.The shortest series covers around four years, 
while the longest spans across 11 years. Annual GDP growth data is from World Bank. 
 France Italy Spain Netherlands Israel Germany Mexico
Implied Yields (monthly closes) 
Average 2.45% 4.22% 4.34% 3.86% 3.14% 2.02% 6.54%
Maximum 5.17% 6.83% 7.21% 6.29% 6.30% 4.93% 10.67%
Minimum 0.09% 0.30% 0.36% 0.07% 0.02% 0.08% 0.95%
Std. Dev. 1.28% 2.26% 2.55% 1.17% 1.20% 1.03% 1.89%
Time to Maturity 
Average 12.90 13.76 14.42 13.76 9.60 12.84 9.34
Maximum 25.87 28.58 27.66 25.75 18.82 26.29 15.12
Minimum 1.23 0.92 0.96 0.73 0.14 1.06 2.04
Std. Dev. 4.31 5.65 5.15 5.44 4.42 5.10 3.19
Government Debt to GDP Ratios 
Average 66.70% 109.30% 50.45% 54.90% 77.51% 70.59% 41.62%
Maximum 85.80% 120.10% 68.50% 69.77% 79.41% 82.40% 44.60%
Minimum 56.90% 103.60% 36.10% 45.30% 76.05% 60.40% 37.80%
GDP Growth Rates 
Average 1.69% 1.32% 2.11% 0.27% 0.86% 0.22% 2.03%
Maximum 2.92% 3.04% 4.04% 0.85% 1.05% 0.98% 5.08%
Minimum -3.91% -6.54% -4.42% -0.93% 0.05% -0.70% -4.68%
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Table II  Estimated Unknown State Variables of Penalty, Forgiveness and Threshold 
under an Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) model  
This table reports the results for a UKF algorithm on the barrier-option model in (2) for the years between 
2003 and 2012. The scheme of creating sigma points according to Julier and Uhlmann (2004) has been 
modified to accommodate the non-negativity requirement of yields. The state dynamic function is a simple 
mean-reverting process, while the measurement process applies directly from (2). The discount rate δ in (2) 
is assumed to be at 2%. The continuous interest rate is approximated by the short rate of each respective 
country. The volatility parameter is calculated with quarterly GDP of each country. GDP values are deflated 
first by the 2002 figures and then scaled to 100. The face value of debt is the government debt to GDP ratio 
times 100. The theoretical values of the three unknown state variables are generated randomly, and are also 
assumed to be mean-reverting. The starting values of k, g, and h are therefore set respectively at 0.05, 0.1 and 
0.5. 
France Italy Spain Netherlands Israel Germany Mexico
Repayment Award (k) 
Average 0.0318 0.0621 0.0762 0.0495 0.0587 0.0221 0.1446
Estimates for std. dev. 0.0046 0.0129 0.0147 0.0081 0.0089 0.0036 0.0227
Maximum 0.0444 0.1238 0.1379 0.0915 0.0862 0.0331 0.2021
Minimum 0.0190 0.0302 0.0294 0.0269 0.0304 0.0135 0.0940
Std. err. of estimates 0.0032 0.0038 0.0041 0.0035 0.0034 0.0025 0.0033
Forgiveness (g) 
Average 0.0601 0.1390 0.1510 0.0893 0.1015 0.0374 0.2845
Estimates for std. dev. 0.0113 0.0211 0.0249 0.0176 0.0155 0.0054 0.0433
Maximum 0.0969 0.2583 0.3005 0.1839 0.1321 0.0502 0.5428
Minimum 0.0305 0.0359 0.0401 0.0343 0.0414 0.0226 0.1579
Std. err. of estimates 0.0031 0.0035 0.0035 0.0032 0.0032 0.0029 0.0034
Default Threshold (h) 
Average 0.6534 0.8452 0.9130 0.7274 0.7565 0.5641 1.4044
Estimates for std. dev. 0.1088 0.1343 0.1577 0.1151 0.1209 0.0856 0.2161
Maximum 0.8168 1.2039 1.4445 0.8847 0.9129 0.7423 1.8539
Minimum 0.4318 0.6875 0.6641 0.5086 0.5669 0.3848 1.1035
Std. err. of estimates 0.0097 0.0108 0.0105 0.0101 0.0100 0.0096 0.0114
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Table III  Estimated Unknown State Variables of Penalty, Forgiveness and Threshold 
under an Interactive Multiple Model with UKF (IMM-UKF) Algorithm 
The IMM-UKF is applied on the same input data for Table II with the same parameters assumed. UKF is 
used in the filtering stage in every step instead of the standard Kalman filter. In each month, for a given 
country, combined or probability-weighted estimates for state mean and covariance matrix are 
calculated. Reported in this table are the averages of estimated standard deviations and means for 
the three state variables across the 120 months. 
France Italy Spain Netherlands Israel Germany Mexico
Repayment Award (k) 
Average 0.0349 0.0657 0.0803 0.0536 0.0609 0.0255 0.1493
Estimates for std. dev. 0.0041 0.0115 0.0131 0.0076 0.0082 0.0032 0.0183
Maximum 0.0413 0.1039 0.1119 0.0861 0.0848 0.0302 0.1912
Minimum 0.0285 0.0375 0.0403 0.0396 0.0353 0.0192 0.1005
Std. err. of estimates 0.0030 0.0034 0.0036 0.0032 0.0032 0.0023 0.0032
Forgiveness (g) 
Average 0.0535 0.1226 0.1318 0.0802 0.0885 0.0337 0.2451
Estimates for std. dev. 0.0097 0.0167 0.0189 0.0129 0.0113 0.0049 0.0349
Maximum 0.0874 0.1941 0.2216 0.1240 0.1185 0.0477 0.3949
Minimum 0.0492 0.0697 0.0754 0.0522 0.0538 0.0291 0.1764
Std. err. of estimates 0.0029 0.0032 0.0033 0.0030 0.0030 0.0027 0.0032
Default Threshold (h) 
Average 0.5801 0.7339 0.7992 0.6536 0.6860 0.5113 1.1308
Estimates for std. dev. 0.0952 0.1175 0.1284 0.1044 0.1072 0.0768 0.1759
Maximum 0.7633 1.0424 1.1936 0.8134 0.8229 0.6809 1.5523
Minimum 0.4827 0.6811 0.6820 0.5601 0.5732 0.4266 1.0211
Std. err. of estimates 0.0092 0.0101 0.0102 0.0095 0.0095 0.0091 0.0107
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Table IV Comparisons between Forecasting Performances against EKF 
for given time to maturity  
One-period forecasting performances of UKF and IMM-UKF are compared against those form an Extended 
Kalman Filter (EKF) algorithm. Estimations are produced, for each month in 2013, using the previous 60 
months, and one-month ahead forecasted yields for each month in 2013 are compared against observed 
yields. 22 yield series with maturity less than a year are excluded. The remaining 676 series are divided into 
4 maturity groups, with 96 having the maturity between 1 and 5, 188 between 6 and 10, 274 between 11 and 
15 and 218 between 16 and above. For each maturity group, Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSE) and Mean 
Absolute Errors (MAE) are calculated monthly for all issues over 2013.   
(in basis points) 16 and above 11-15 6-10 1-5 
UKF Estimations 
RMSE  115.91 75.82  42.08  13.42  
MAE 93.63 61.25  34.24  11.79  
IMM-UKF Estimations 
RMSE 106.13  70.98  40.40  12.96  
MAE 91.81  60.05  33.57  10.34  
EKF Estimations 
RMSE 134.88  86.23  47.11  14.83  
MAE 103.10  67.44  37.70  13.18  
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Table V Estimations on Simulated Yields for Unobservable State Variables 
under an Unscented Kalman Filter model  
This table reports the results of Unscented Kalman Filter algorithm applied on simulated yields of various 
maturities based on (2). The discount rate is assumed to be at 2%, short rate at 1.5%, GDP growth volatility at 25% 
and debt to GDP ratio at 75%. For the simulation, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.7 are assumed for k, g and h. They are further 
randomized and substituted into (4) to obtain raw yields. For each maturity, 20,000 simulated yields are generated 
with a lognormal distribution having the raw yield of respective maturity as its mean. For the maturity of 20 years, 
simulated yields average at 5.48% with a standard error at 0.74%. The average simulated yields are 3.71%, 2.97% 
and 1.34% for the 10-year, 5-year and 1-year debt. The standard errors are 0.62% , 0.38% and 0.19% respectively. 
       20-year        10-year         5-year          1-year    
  UKF    IMM-UKF   UKF    IMM-UKF   UKF    IMM-UKF   UKF    IMM-UKF 
Repayment Award (k) 
Average 0.0805 0.0849 0.0571 0.0602 0.0395 0.0411 0.0185 0.0195
Estimates for std. dev. 0.0104 0.0722 0.0080 0.0058 0.0062 0.0046 0.0031 0.0024
Maximum 0.0971 0.1033 0.0607 0.0749 0.0469 0.0571 0.0332 0.0420
Minimum 0.0353 0.0536 0.0182 0.0309 0.0144 0.0253 0.0108 0.0165
Std. err. of estimates 0.0009 0.0007 0.0012 0.0010 0.0016 0.0013 0.0021 0.0016
Forgiveness (g) 
Average 0.1830 0.1598 0.1245 0.1073 0.0884 0.0767 0.0319 0.0285
Estimates for std. dev. 0.0321 0.0269 0.0226 0.0188 0.0155 0.0129 0.0064 0.0054
Maximum 0.2771 0.2136 0.1893 0.1477 0.1105 0.1020 0.0528 0.0429
Minimum 0.0648 0.0885 0.0482 0.0613 0.0344 0.0552 0.0127 0.0161
Std. err. of estimates 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0010 0.0009 0.0013 0.0012
Default Threshold (h) 
Average 0.7163 0.6249 0.5351 0.4641 0.3815 0.3301 0.2529 0.2213
Estimates for std. dev. 0.1045 0.0837 0.0784 0.0658 0.0569 0.0494 0.0388 0.0351
Maximum 1.1306 0.9323 0.8528 0.7012 0.6110 0.5130 0.4207 0.3439
Minimum 0.2725 0.3462 0.2261 0.2781 0.1852 0.2159 0.1613 0.1878
Std. err. of estimates 0.0093 0.0074 0.0077 0.0063 0.0054 0.0045 0.0036 0.0030
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Table VI  Regressions of Sovereign CDS on State Variables 
Estimated from UKF and IMM-UKF 
For each country, changes of monthly five-year sovereign CDS spreads observations taken from Datastream 
are regressed on changes of estimated monthly k, g and h values in Table II and III respectively. 
France Italy Spain Netherlands Israel Germany Mexico 
UKF 
k 0.0354 
(0.0287)
0.0412 
(0.0255)
0.0463*
(0.0263)
0.0388 
(0.0248)
0.0376 
(0.0251)
0.0311 
(0.0290)
0.0449* 
(0.0246)
g 0.0807* 
(0.0494)
0.0735**
(0.0323)
0.0727**
(0.0341)
0.0784*
(0.0423)
0.0792* 
(0.0441)
0.0889 
(0.0515)
0.0486**
(0.0242)
h 0.0013 
(0.0008)
0.0017 
(0.0010)
0.0019
(0.0012)
0.0015 
(0.0009)
0.0015 
(0.0009)
0.0011 
(0.0006)
0.0021* 
(0.0012)
R-squared 0.1521 0.1774 0.2035 0.1709 0.1813 0.1110 0.2332 
IMM-UKF 
k 0.0376 
(0.0245)
0.0455* 
(0.0216)
0.0486**
(0.0224)
0.0438*
(0.0252)
0.0429* 
(0.0261)
0.0393 
(0.0272)
0.0467**
(0.0219)
g 0.0831**
(0.0335)
0.0748**
(0.0301)
0.0762**
(0.0319)
0.0802**
(0.0293)
0.0810**
(0.0287)
0.0919** 
(0.0366)
0.0502**
(0.0265)
h 0.0014**
(0.0006)
0.0019**
(0.0007)
0.0020**
(0.0009)
0.0016**
(0.0007)
0.0016**
(0.0007)
0.0012** 
(0.0006)
0.0022**
(0.0010)
R-squared 0.1733 0.2128 0.2467 0.1921 0.2033 0.1554 0.2617 
 
 
